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First, can you tell us something about yourself, 
your work and your interests in history? What 
made you become fascinated by the First World 
War? 
 
I graduated in 1974 from the University 
of Cologne (having studied history, 
political science and German language 
and literature) and then taught for a 
couple of years at University College 
Dublin and at the Heinrich Heine-
Universität of Düsseldorf (as assistant to 
Wolfgang J. Mommsen), where I received 
my doctorate in 1981. For eleven years I 
worked as a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute in London 
before I became director of the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Library of 
Contemporary History) in Stuttgart, an international research library with 
archival collections specializing in the period from 1914 to the present. I 
was a NIAS-Fellow at Wassenaar in 1996/1997 and in the same year I was 
appointed Professor of Modern History at the University of Stuttgart.  
There are basically two reasons why I became interested in the 
history of the First World War. First I began my professional work as a 
historian of the Second World War – my dissertation dealt with the Nazi 
occupation of the Netherlands and the question of accommodation and 
collaboration exercised by large parts of the Dutch population – and I kept 
asking myself if the history of the German occupation would have turned 
out differently if the Netherlands had not been spared the experience of a 
previous total war. The second reason derives from the fact that the Library 
of Contemporary History in Stuttgart as an ‘offspring’ of the ‘Great War’ 
holds among its vast collections extremely fascinating material (i.e. posters, 
military maps, photos, soldiers’ front-letters) from this important and 









In most of the literature about the First World War, Emperor Wilhelm II is seen as the 
instigator of the Great War. Do you agree that the Kaiser has been the person who was 
responsible for the outbreak of the War?  
 
The German emperor Wilhelm II carries a high political as well as moral 
responsibility for the outbreak of the war in the summer of 1914, but he 
does so in a wider, in a more general sense. For more than two decades the 
Kaiser shaped the essence as well as the style of German foreign policy, 
rebuking and undermining all sensible approaches (even those by his own 
Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg) for détente and a 
lasting peace in Europe. During the so-called July-crisis Wilhelm’s position, 
however, remained largely undecisive: while publicly giving Austria-Hungary 
’carte blanche’ for punishing the ‘rabble- and robber-state’, as Serbia was 
called by Wilhelm II, he was obviously not prepared to risk an all-out war 
which probably would have serious consequences for the monarchy. In the 
course of the war, the Kaiser’s authority gradually diminished and he had 
only little, almost nothing to say in military matters. He nevertheless 
remained an important figure within the complicated power structure of the 
German Reich, due to his constitutional role as head of state and his say in 
all matters of personnel at the top.  
 
 
In 1916, Paul von Hindenburg took over the Military High Command from Erich von 
Falkenhayn, and Erich Ludendorff became second in command. Thereafter, these two 
men wielded so much power that even the Kaiser lost his influence. Many historians speak 
of a military dictatorship, which Hindenburg and Ludendorff established until the end of 
the War. How would you describe the role of Ludendorff during the Great War? In fact, 
how strong was his position? 
 
The Third Military High Command (OHL), which was formed in the 
summer of 1916 and lasted until October 1918, consisted of a dual 
leadership by the generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich von Ludendorff, 
the ‘saviours of East Prussia’ from the Russian invasion in 1914. Unlike 
their predecessors, the Third OHL massively intervened in all civilian and 
economic affairs. Despite the fact that the megalomaniacal ‘Hindenburg 
program’ with its social coercive measures (‘Hilfsdienstgesetz’) largely 
remained a paper exercise, both generals gained an almost dictatorial 
position, even vis-à-vis the Kaiser and the Reich Chancellor. The German 
contemporary sociologist Max Weber already described the Third OHL as a 




‘political military dictatorship’. The ageing Field Marshall Hindenburg 
gradually came to occupy a symbolic role, previously held by Bismarck and 
the Kaiser. It was his ‘First Quarter Master General’ Ludendorff, who 
became the driving force behind all important military and political 
decisions. As ‘The silent dictator’ (Martin Kitchen) Ludendorff remained 
the strategic and political leader while Hindenburg authorized the respective 
orders and put his name to them. The withdrawal of German troops behind 
the ‘Hindenburg line’ after the battle of the Somme or the setting-up of far-
reaching annexational goals for a victorious ‘Hindenburg peace’ – were all 
planned and initiated by Ludendorff himself. Only when faced with total 
defeat, at the end of October 1918, was Ludendorff dismissed and replaced 
by General Wilhelm Groener (Fourth OHL).  
 
 
What were the motives of the German political and military leaders for waging War and 
how do you see these motives in connection with the ‘Septemberprogramm’ of 1914 (a 'list' 
of territorial demands, set up by government officials and some industrialists and signed by 
the Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to be introduced after Germany had won the 
war)?  
 
Long before the outbreak of hostilities, German conservative elites were 
convinced that a European war would cut the Gordian knot of German 
‘Weltpolitik’ and thus help to fulfil their often declared ambitions for 
colonies and for military as well as political prestige in the world. Some 
politicians and military men clearly hoped that a war involving all classes of 
society would also help to undermine or perhaps even halt the apparently 
unstoppable rise of the social-democratic workers movement. The actual 
decision to go to war over a relatively minor international crisis like the 
Sarajevo murder, however, resulted from a fatal mixture of political 
misjudgement, fear of loss of prestige and stubborn commitments on all 
sides of a very complicated system of military and political alliances of 
European states. 
In contrast to the German historian Fritz Fischer who saw German 
war aims, and in particular the ‘Septemberprogramm’ of 1914, with its far 
reaching economic and territorial demands, as the core of the German 
government’s decision to go to war, most historians nowadays dismiss this 
interpretation as being too narrow. These historians and I happen to agree 
with them, tend to place German war aims, or incidentally all other 
belligerent nations’ war aims, in the contexts of military events and political 




developments during the war.  
 
 
Do you agree with Hans-Ulrich Wehler that in fact there has been a second Thirty Year 
War which lasted from 1914 to 1945? 
  
The thesis of a second Thirty Years War between 1914 and 1945 was first 
expressed by General Charles de Gaulle during his exile years in London 
and popularized by Raymond Aron in the 1950s. It rests on the assumption 
that the First World War formed the seedbed for the Second. Of course, 
there has not been an uncontested continuity from one war to the other – 
politicians but also the people during the interbellum certainly had political 
options – but neither the Bolshevist revolution nor the rise of Fascism 
respectively National Socialism would have been possible without the 
experience and outcome of the First World War. Thus the two wars belong 
together and they explain each other. 
Besides, both world wars are inextricably linked by a number of 
historical phenomena: Both were mass industrialized wars, characterized by 
a common and lasting experience of uncontrolled and excessive violence, 
death and destruction. Both wars saw an expansion of the means and 
methods of warfare including new and powerful military technology and 
weapons, but also a general extension (‘Entgrenzung’) of the war into all 
areas of human live. Regarding the First World War I just refer to 
Germany’s unrestricted U-boat warfare, the British sea blockade of German 
ports causing mass starvation inside Germany, the bombardment of enemy 
towns by heavy artillery and airplanes, the systematic destruction of a 
country’s infrastructure and landscape (as with the German retreat from the 
Somme) or the deployment of gas, first on the Western front but later also 
in the East, in the Balkans and even in the Alpes. And there are the 
deportations and mass killings of the Armenian population in 1915, the first 
genocide ordered by a state in the twentieth century. I do not think it is 












In your article ‘Erster Weltkrieg – Zweiter Weltkrieg: Kriegserfahrungen in 
Deutschland. Neuere Ansätze und Uberlegungen zu einem diachronen Vergleich’, you 
write that for countries like Germany, Russia and The Netherlands, the Second World 
War is more important than the First World War. This is contrary to the experience of 
countries like France and England. How do you explain this difference?  
 
The two World Wars are remembered differently – even until today. While 
for the French, Belgians, British and Australians (to name just four of the 
former allied countries) the First World War still remains ‘La Grande 
Guerre’, ‘The Great War’ or ‘De Grote Oorlog’, the Germans, Russians and 
also the Dutch (though for different reasons) look to the Second World 
War as the most decisive historical event and watershed in the history of the 
twentieth century. Russians view the war against Nazi Germany (1941-
1945), which caused incredible loss of live, as their ‘Great Patriotic War’. 
The Dutch still see the oppressive German occupation (1940-1945) but 
particularly their country’s liberation in 1945 as historical beacons, while the 
First World War still lies ‘beyond our national sphere of remembrance’ 
(Maarten Brands). As far as Germany is concerned, the Second World War 
(unlike the previous one with the exception of the short-lived Russian 
invasion of East Prussia in 1914) was also fought on German soil, involving 
the civilian population and resulting in a colossal number of deaths and 
wounded exceeding that of the First World War by far. For Germans today 
this war is forever linked with the establishment and rule of the Nazi 
dictatorship, which, along with other barbarous crimes against humanity, 
caused the Shoah, the murder of six million European Jews.  
With the generational change of our cultural and historical memory 
in the years to come, Europeans will have to face a further historisation of 
the first half of the Twentieth Century that will draw both World Wars and 
the interbellum stronger together than ever before. The inevitable process of 
historisation will also affect – I think it has already begun – and influence 
the work of historians. This is not just the case with historians using a 
generational approach to history (like Ulrich Herbert in his fascinating study 
on Werner Best or Michael Wildt in his recent collective biography of the 
functionaries of the Reich Security Office). Also historians who are seeking, 
for example, to explain the barbarisation of warfare or the excessive use of 
violence against civilians during the Second World War have no choice but 
to look back to the events and the repercussions of the previous ‘total war’.   
 
 




The Netherlands were neutral during the First World War. This was deliberately 
maintained in the German war plan by Von Moltke. According to Moltke, the 
Netherlands would be a Luftröhre that would give Germany the necessary air to breathe 
during the war. How important do you think Dutch neutrality was for German warfare?  
 
While the first Schlieffen-plan of 1905 still considered the possibility of 
German troops invading the neutral Netherlands, Schlieffen’s successor as 
chief of the general staff, Helmuth von Moltke the younger, saw more 
advantages than disadvantages in respecting Dutch neutrality: the 
Netherlands should become a steady supplier for Germany’s much needed 
foodstuffs and, by keeping open import and export lines for German 
industry, help to bypass the expected British naval control and sea blockade. 
Moltke was proved right: the Netherlands became an asset for the German 
war economy. By 1915 Dutch export of pork alone to Germany was five 
times higher than before the war. The German economy also gained from 
the setting-up (in late 1914) of the Netherlands Overseas Trust (NOT), 
technically a private company, which expanded into an extremely powerful 
institution that soon took control of all foreign trade of the Netherlands. 
The NOT struck a deal with the Entente powers, particularly with Britain, 
which allowed the Netherlands to maintain their overseas trade, while at the 
same time the company’s existence helped to facilitate illegal (mostly 
agrarian) exports to Germany on an enormous scale. As a countermove 
Dutch industry received the urgently needed coal from the mining areas of 
the Ruhr. Increasing German military pressure after 1917 – most obvious 
from the Third OHL under Ludendorff – forced the Dutch government 
under the cautiously pro-German premier Cort van der Linden (nicknamed: 
Caught unter den Linden) to make even further concessions (for instance, 
parts of the German military supply for the Flanders front ran on Dutch 
railway tracks).    
 
 
Are there any important differences in the way German and non-German historians look 
at the First World War? Can you identify a national historiography or do you see now a 
general consensus existing among historians around the world?  
 
Historiography about the ‘Great War’ has surely become an international 
trade. There is hardly any other period in modern history that has, in recent 
years, benefited likewise from scholarly exchange or joint ventures such as 
conferences and publications. This is not least due to the existence of 




international research groups and centers like the one attached to the 
‘Historial de la Grande Guerre’ in Péronne or of scientific networks like the 
Society for World War One Studies which especially caters for university 
graduates doing a Ph.D. in this field.  
The number of publications, notably on a cultural history of the war, 
has multiplied since the mid-1980s. Initially, German historians were a little 
reluctant to engage in writing a history of war mentalities or of war culture 
like their French and Anglo-Saxon colleagues did. These scholars took up 
the tradition of the Annales School or followed in the footsteps of cultural 
historians like George L. Mosse or literary scholars like Paul Fussell. This, 
however, has changed and ‘Kulturgeschichte des Kriegs’ like the French 
concept of ‘guerre et culture’ have become modern trademarks of the First 
World War historiography – in Germany as elsewhere. There are, 
thankfully, still scholarly controversies and debates among historians 
engaged in writing about the First World War (recently on the concept of 
‘total war’, on the contradictions of the international system since 1911 and 
the responsibilities of the general staffs in preparing the ‘Great War’, or on 
the collective experiences and representations of violence in the interbellum 
generated by the war) but these disputes do not any longer develop along 
national lines or issues.  
 
 
Which book(s) about the First World War do you see as the leading work(s) at the 
moment?  
 
This is a particularly hard one but I will not disappoint your readers. 
Therefore I have chosen ten books which, in the last 50 years, have sparked 
important historical debates or contributed in a fine scholarly way to our 
modern interpretation of the ‘Great War’ (and my apologies to all my 
colleagues not included in this list): 
 
Jean-Jacques Becker, 1914, comment les Francais sont entrés dans la guerre. 
Contribution à l’étude de l’opinion publique, printemps – été 1914 (Paris 
1977). 
 
Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 
(Princeton, NJ 1966). 
 
Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen 
Deutschland 1914/18 (Düsseldorf 1961). 





Paul Fussel, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York 1975). 
 
Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz eds, Enzyklopädie 
Erster Weltkrieg (second edition; Paderborn et al. 2004). 
 
Jürgen Kocka, Klassengesellschaft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-
1918 (Göttingen 1973). 
 
George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars 
(New York et al. 1990). 
 
George H. Soutou, L’or et le sang. Les buts de guerre économique de la 
Première Guerre mondiale (Paris 1989). 
 
Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. 1: To Arms (Oxford 2001) 
(2 vols to follow). 
 
Jay M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London 1986). 
 
If I were to choose just one book I would not hesitate to recommend our 
own Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg (first published in 2003), to which 146 
historians from 15 countries have contributed, and where your readers 
should find answers to most of their questions concerning the history as 
well as the historiography of the First World War. 
 
 
Are there any subjects within the historiography of the First World War which still need 
a lot of research? 
 
What we really need are comparative studies of the political, social, 
economic, cultural and mental processes taking place before, during and 
also after the First World War involving a number of the belligerent but 
also the neutral countries. There are already some interim results presented 
by Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert with the help of international research 
groups in their impressive comparative study on Capital Cities at War: Paris, 
London, Berlin, 1914-1919 (Cambridge 1997). Besides, the Eastern front and 
also the fronts in the Balkans have so far not received the scholarly 
attention these areas of the war deserve to find. We know very little of the 
war experiences of the Russian, the Serbian, the Austrian-Hungarian or any 




other nations’ soldiers fighting in the East or the South East, and we know 
even less of the plight of the civilian population in those parts of Europe. 
The same goes for the First World War history of the Ottoman Empire 
which so far has only been dealt with by a handful of experts on Turkish 
history. There is, however, a steadily growing interest (particularly by 
scholars of Genocide Studies) in the deportations and mass murder of the 
Armenians, but the current preoccupation with this first full-blown 
genocide in the history of the twentieth century (after many years of 
regretful neglect) should not become an obstacle to working on other 
important historical questions and themes related to the Ottoman Empire at 
war. And finally, if we really want to know why the First World War was a 
truly global affair, we should do more research into the war history of the 
European colonies in Africa and Asia, but also into the fate of those 
coloured non-European soldiers fighting in the colonies as well as on many 
European battlefields.  
 
 
What research are you involved in at the moment? Can you give us a little preview of 
what it is about?  
 
I am currently working on two projects. Together with my colleagues Gerd 
Krumeich and Irina Renz (and with support from some very renowned 
international historians) I am preparing a general reader about the Germans 
at the Somme 1914-1918. Besides a number of introductory essays, this book 
will contain mostly unpublished German documents (i.e. extracts from 
soldiers diaries and letters, poems, personal memories) and other archival 
material (also private photos and sketches) which should throw more light 
on some, up to now rather neglected, aspects of the history of the Somme, 
one of the bloodiest battlegrounds of the First World War. It deals with the 
German occupation leading up to the famous Somme battle of 1916, the 
German retreat behind the Hindenburg line in early 1917, practising a policy 
of scorched earth, and the so-called second battle at the Somme in 1918, 
where tanks played a decisive role. 
The other book I am writing at the moment and which will surely 
keep me busy for some time to come, is a comprehensive history of the 
Netherlands in the 20th century, meant for an educated German audience. It 
will cover the period 1890 to 2000 and is part of a new series called 
‘Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert’ by Beck Publishers in Munich. 
Rather than adopting the current dominant paradigm of a ‘short 20th 




century’ (1914 - 1989/1990), where the outbreak (or rather the outcome) of 
the First World War is regarded as the beginning of wide-ranging political 
and territorial changes in Europe, our ‘European History’ will take into 
account the manifold processes of modernity which were already well 
underway before the ‘great seminal catastrophy’ of the First World War 
took place. It should be interesting to see how the characteristics and 
peculiarities of modern Dutch history will fit into such a general European 
framework.  
 
Thank you very much for answering our questions! 
 
